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As we push toward new and diverse space transportation capabilities, reduction in operations cost 
becomes increasingly important.  Achieving affordable and safe human spaceflight capabilities will be 
the mark of success for new programs and new providers.  The ability to perceive the operational 
implications of design decisions is crucial in developing safe yet cost competitive space transportation 
systems.  Any human spaceflight program – government or commercial – must make countless decisions 
either to implement spacecraft system capabilities or adopt operational constraints or workarounds to 
account for the lack of such spacecraft capabilities. These decisions can benefit from the collective 
experience that NASA has accumulated in building and operating crewed spacecraft over the last five 
decades. 
 
This paper reviews NASA’s history in developing and operating human rated spacecraft, reviewing the 
key aspects of spacecraft design and their resultant impacts on operations phase complexity and cost.  
Specific examples from current and past programs – including the Space Shuttle and International Space 
Station– are provided to illustrate design traits that either increase or increase cost and complexity 
associated with spacecraft operations.   These examples address factors such as overall design 
performance margins, levels of redundancy, degree of automated failure response, type and quantity of 
command and telemetry interfaces, and the definition of reference scenarios for analysis and test. 
Each example– from early program requirements, design implementation and resulting real-time 
operations experience – to tell the end-to-end “story” 
 
Based on these experiences, specific techniques are recommended to enable earlier and more effective 
assessment of operations concerns during the design process.  A formal method for the assessment of 
spacecraft operability is defined and results of such operability assessments for recent spacecraft 
designs are provided.  Recent experience in applying these techniques to Orion spacecraft development 
is reviewed to highlight the direct benefits of early operational assessment and collaborative 
development efforts. 
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As we push towards new and diverse space transportation capabilities, reduction in operations cost 
becomes increasingly important.  Achieving affordable and safe human spaceflight capabilities will 
be the mark of success for new programs and new providers.  The ability to perceive the 
operational implications of design decisions is crucial in developing safe yet cost competitive space 
transportation systems.  Any human spaceflight program – government or commercial – must 
make countless decisions either to implement spacecraft system capabilities or adopt operational 
constraints or workarounds to account for the lack of such spacecraft capabilities. These decisions 
can benefit from the collective experience that NASA has accumulated in building and operating 
crewed spacecraft over the last five decades.  This paper reviews NASA’s history in developing and 
operating human rated spacecraft, reviewing the key aspects of spacecraft design and their 
resultant impacts on operations phase complexity and cost.  Specific examples from current and 
past programs – including the Space Shuttle and International Space Station– are provided to 
illustrate design traits that either increase or decrease cost and complexity associated with 
spacecraft operations.   These examples address factors such as overall design performance 
margins, levels of redundancy, degree of automation, type and quantity of command and telemetry 
interfaces, and the definition of reference scenarios for analysis and test. Based on these 
experiences, specific techniques are recommended to enable earlier and more effective assessments 
of operations concerns during the design process.  Recent experience in applying these techniques 
to Orion spacecraft development is reviewed to highlight the direct benefits of early operational 
assessment and collaborative development efforts. This paper serves as a companion piece to the 
earlier published “Designing a Better Spacecraft:  Assessing Flight Operability of Human Rated 
Spacecraft,” presented at the AIAA SpaceOps 2010 conference.  Where the previous paper 
described a method for formal flight operability assessment during spacecraft development, this 
paper provides expanded examples of design practices and their impacts on operability. 
 
I. Introduction 
HE design of a human rated spacecraft is a complex and costly process requiring the integrated assessment of 
many individual criteria. Historically, it has been difficult to include in that integrated assessment the design’s 
full impact on the flight operations community. The unique “operability” requirements have not been well 
understood, nor has there been a well-defined set of criteria for assessing operability.  Spacecraft today are far more 
complex than their predecessors, implementing far larger requirements sets using advanced technologies and 
sophisticated software while providing more onboard capabilities, more telemetry and more operator command 
capabilities.  Just as important as these architectural differences are the differences in missions.  Today, there is a 
much higher expectation with regards to safety, mission success, mission frequency, and affordability.  These all 
present challenges to the program and flight operations communities. 
Spacecraft requirements definition, design, manufacture and test is a complex and demanding series of processes 
that must take into account a vast array of considerations and constraints including safety standards, schedule and 
cost constraints, and even political factors.  With all of these competing factors influencing the design process, it is 
at best challenging to develop a spacecraft that enables low operations phase cost. However, an awareness of the 
factors that impact flight operations costs, and a method to directly measure these impacts, can arm future spacecraft 
development program management and engineering organizations to better address these costs during the earlier 
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phases of a human spaceflight program. This same understanding can also benefit non-government organizations as 
they make their first attempts to build and fly human-rated spacecraft. 
II. The Flight Operations Job 
To understand the impacts of a spacecraft design on flight operations cost, it is necessary to first understand the 
basic function of flight operations.  Apollo 11 flight director and former director of NASA JSC's Mission Operations 
Directorate Eugene Kranz defined the flight operations infrastructure as a system designed to “maximize mission 
success, to minimize risks to the [vehicle] and the crew, to decrease operating costs, and to achieve an effective 
balance in the application of all operational resources.1
Fundamentally, flight operations definition is a set of 
systems engineering tasks.  Crewmembers, flight 
controllers, analysts and instructors must all understand 
the integrated operation of the vehicle – the capabilities 
and constraints of each vehicle subsystem as well as the 
subsystems interactions, dependencies and impacts on the 
rest of the spacecraft.  Development of generic procedures 
and operating constraints (referred to as “flight rules”), 
such as the examples provided in figures 1 and 2, involves 
thorough analysis of all of these factors.  This effort often 
uncovers new integration issues – unexpected 
consequences of the design implementation, often 
associated with the impacts of one subsystem’s operation 
on that of another.  For example, operations assessments 
in the International Space Station (ISS) Preliminary 
Design Review timeframe unveiled that too many of the 
critical electrical power cables were routed through the 
same portion of the US Lab module, resulting in a 
complete loss of power to critical US systems when smoke 
detection triggered an automatic power down of 
equipment and wiring in that volume.  Once discovered, 
the wire routing was altered to provide a more robust 
design and a more operable spacecraft.  In this and similar 
ways, flight operations performs critical systems 
engineering and integration tasks throughout the 
program’s lifecycle.   
”  The flight operations community picks up where the 
development community leaves off, turning generic design reference missions and system test cases into plans, 
procedures, and operating guidelines to meet the requirements and constraints of real missions.  The successes and 
shortcomings experienced in the development, integration and test phases directly impact the form that flight 
operations takes.  Where system operating characteristics, 
limits and reliability are known quantities, the operations 
community can plan and execute missions with a 
predictable cost.  When this key information is 
unavailable, or mission requirements grow beyond the 
scope of that information, operations cost are difficult to 
characterize and can grow significantly to meet mission 
demands. 
 
This systems engineering and integration role continues – and even expands – as the program enters its 
operations phase and the details of specific missions must be defined. Mission specific planning entails the analysis 
not only of the generic operations constraints defined during spacecraft development, but also the unique constraints 
imposed by the mission requirements and payloads.  Typical challenges include complex power configurations and 
reconfigurations to meet power budget limits, reconfiguration of attitude control system settings to conserve 
propellant, and flight attitude restrictions imposed not only due to communications line-of-sight constraints, but also 
concerns over overheating or freezing of individual spacecraft components.  At the same time, flight plans must 
provide for efficient use of crew time and communications bandwidth to support mission goals such as science, 
Figure 2. Example Space Shuttle flight rule. 
 
Figure 1. Example Space Shuttle procedure. 
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3 
engineering tests, and in-space assembly operations.  The flight plan, and associated mission-specific flight rules, 
procedures, analyses, and operator training, 
comprise a thorough, integrated system of its 
own – a flight operations system that interacts 
with the spacecraft to accomplish the mission. 
A sample page from a Space Shuttle detailed 
mission timeline is given in Figure 3. 
A. The Role of the Flight Crew 
From the beginning of the US human 
spaceflight program, the most critical part of 
the flight crew’s job has been that of system 
management.  Certainly, piloting skills are 
crucial for the astronaut, but the human's 
unique ability to assess and respond to unique 
circumstances make the entire spacecraft more 
robust. The primary role of the project 
Mercury astronaut was that of monitoring 
spacecraft system operation and intervening 
when necessary.2  Onboard automation had successfully managed simple missions, but the onboard “sequencer” 
hardware proved to be a troublesome system to integrate and test.3
The importance of this role was illustrated in numerous significant events during Mercury flight operations.  On 
the United States’ first human orbital mission, MA-6, John Glenn took manual control of spacecraft attitude when 
malfunctions in the automated attitude control system threatened to deplete the vehicle’s propellant.  On the later 
MA-8 mission, Wally Schirra overrode environmental control system functions to lower escalating suit 
temperatures, thereby avoiding an early mission termination.
 The human flight crew was the ultimate backup 
and could take control of the vehicle in most phases of flight using a separate manual control system implemented 
alongside the automated systems.   
4
As NASA gained experience and confidence in the abilities of humans to work effectively in space, it was 
recognized that further implementing human-in-the-loop solutions resulted in higher reliability.  The Gemini 
spacecraft design capitalized on these findings, reducing the level of automation and providing better display and 
control capabilities to enhance the human’s ability to operate the vehicle. 
  Such flight experience demonstrated that this monitor 
and override role was a demanding, time consuming task for the crewmember. 
B. The Role of Mission Control  
The Mission Control Center (MCC) provides a necessary capability both during normal operations and in the 
event of the unexpected.  Real-time MCC support provides more insight, more experience, and more resource to 
augment the crew throughout mission execution.  The MCC provides analysis results, generates plans and 
procedures to optimize the crew's productivity, performing spacecraft system monitoring and control, and 
coordinating with external engineering expertise as required to address problems encountered in flight. Overall, 
MCC provides a both a strategic planning capability and an additional systems management resource that make the 
crew more efficient and maximize the crew’s opportunity for success. 
During nominal operations, these services reduce the crew workload associated with managing onboard systems 
and preparing for upcoming events.  International Space Station (ISS) flight controllers have the full capability to 
operate spacecraft systems just as can the onboard crew, with the exception of strictly manual tasks such as opening 
and closing hatches.  By exercising these capabilities from the ground, MCC support enables the crew to concentrate 
on supporting the core mission of the ISS – execution of experiments and tests in the unique laboratory environment 
that ISS provides.  Without MCC support, the onboard crew would be required to spend more time managing the 
spacecraft core systems and less time in meeting the scientific objectives of the ISS program. 
During complex operations such as vehicle rendezvous and docking or response to onboard system failures, 
MCC provides more “eyes” and “hands.”  Again, MCC can execute procedures from the ground, offloading the 
crew during intense operations periods and allowing crewmembers to focus on physical tasks that only they can 
perform.  The spacecraft’s extensive telemetry and remote command capabilities, matched with extensive system 
specialist training give MCC flight controller the most detailed insight and skill in responding to system failures.   
 
Figure 3. Example Space Shuttle detailed mission timeline. 
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C. Evolution of Flight Operations Capabilities 
Growth and change in mission scope accounts for much of the cost for the flight operations community.  Initial 
plans for the Space Shuttle program included only a very limited set of Extravehicular Activity (EVA) operations 
requirements, focused on contingency operations such as manual payload bay door closure following a failure 
preventing nominal, automated door closure.  However, the program expanded Space Shuttle EVA capabilities to 
become a part of normal operations for many flights.  This change alone accounted for a significant increase in the 
cost and complexity of flight operations.5
 Any new program experiences a steep 
learning curve as it first enters the 
operations phase.  Despite the best test, 
integrations, and flight preparation efforts, 
early operations uncover previously 
unknown component operating 
characteristic, failure modes, and system 
interdependencies that can change the 
nature of spacecraft operations.  Figure 4 
illustrates the trend in in-flight anomalies 
experienced throughout the Space Shuttle 
program.  The first 15 years of the 
program provided a wealth of experience 
in new conditions, and new challenges as 
NASA explored the limits of the Space 
Shuttle.  It was only in the second half of 
the 30 year program that the rate of in-
flight anomalies reached a relatively low 
and consistent level. 
 
 At the same time, the process of learning through operations enables greater efficiency.  Over the latter two 
thirds of the Space Shuttle Program – from 1991 to 2011 – the size of the space shuttle flight operations staff shrank 
by over 50% while the number of mission objectives and the complexity of spacecraft systems grew.  As the 
organization learned the true limits and capabilities of the spacecraft, pre-mission planning capabilities improved 
and became more efficient.  The smaller staff proved capable of handling an amazing array of mission scenarios, in 
many ways far beyond the scope of those envisioned at the beginning of the program.  Similar trends continue today 
as International Space Station flight control and instructor positions are combined to achieve a significantly smaller 
overall workforce. 
 Human Spaceflight operations will continue to evolve both as the commercial market for human spaceflight to 
Low Earth Orbit grows and our human exploration efforts reach deeper into the solar system where communications 
between the spacecraft and Earth are limited and delayed. 
 
II. Flight Operability 
The measure of a system's flight operability is the measure of the degree to which that system enables a balance 
of maximum mission success, minimal risk, and minimum operating cost.  Traditionally, the human flight operations 
community has been held to the highest standards of safety and mission success, leaving operating cost as the most 
variable of these factors.    
Any measure of flight operability must encompass the impact on cost, responsiveness and risk incurred in safely 
executing operations with a spacecraft as designed and manufactured. Cost is driven by both the developmental 
investments required to build the operations infrastructure (facilities, operations techniques and products, and trained 
personnel prepared to execute operations) and by the recurring cost of maintaining that infrastructure and by the 
expense of executing mission planning, training and operations over the entire operations phase. Responsiveness 
reflects the time required to plan and execute a given operation.  Excessive time requirements reduce the availability 
and responsiveness of operations. Risk is the likelihood of success or failure of the operation. Additional 
consideration of risk must be given in the case that a failure endangers crew health, vehicle integrity or mission 
success. “Operations Integration” is the practice of weighing and balancing these factors.    
Figure 4. History of Space Shuttle anomalies per flight.  
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Flight operability is not only a function of the vehicle design, but also the mission requirements that the system 
must support. Therefore, a given system design may have different operability “scores” for different types of 
mission scenarios and operations. Consider a vehicle designed solely to achieve and maintain Low Earth Orbit may 
exhibit significant propellant margin in performing that mission. That same vehicle design may provide little or no 
margin if the mission is changed to achieve and maintain a lunar orbit. Therefore, a complete measurement of flight 
operability begins with the definition of the system or vehicle under study and the operational scenario in which 
operability is to be 
assessed. For that 
specific set of design 
and mission conditions, 
operability assessments 
should identify and 
objectively assess the 
key items that impact 
flight operations ability 
to meet safety, mission 
success and operating 
cost constraints.  
A formal method for 
the evaluation of flight 
operability is given in 
“Designing a Better 
Spacecraft:  Assessing 
Flight Operability of 
Human-Rated 
Spacecraft.6
 
” The basic 
decision process used in 
this technique is shown 
in Figure 5. 
 
 
III. The Elements of Flight Operability 
A review of the many individual recommendations of the human spaceflight operations community indicates six 
major operability themes – simplicity, margin, robustness, flexibility, situation awareness and control. These themes 
are discussed below.  Note that, if not properly balanced, these operability themes can pose conflict. Features that 
make a system more robust may also make the system more complex. The judgment of subject matter experts must 
be applied to strike balance in these cases.    
Fundamentally, human flight operations support capability should be tasked primarily with dealing with the 
tough decisions and the less predictable scenarios. Expending significant human effort in executing the predictable, 
the mundane, and the formulaic can be a waste of resources and even a risk.  While humans can conceive of and 
enact novel solutions to unexpected challenges – far more than any automated system – humans are less appropriate 
in performing repetitive tasks in a uniform manner.  To support this decision making process, spacecraft systems 
should provide the flexibility, robustness, and margin necessary.  This includes a well documented, analyzed and 
verified understanding of the real limits of the spacecraft both in the nominal configuration and through a reasonable 
range of off- nominal conditions such as unusual attitudes, contingency power downs, and post-failure operations.  
Armed with this knowledge and understanding, the human operator requires appropriate situation awareness and 
control capability to understand the context of his or her decisions and to efficiently take action on those decisions.  
A. Simplicity 
Simplicity – often referred to with its inverse, complexity – is the collective measure not only of the functions, 
interfaces and dependencies inherent in the system architecture, but also of the observations, decisions and actions 
required of the human operator. The number and ease of operation of functions and interfaces in the operational 
environment drive the number and cost of analyses, tools, procedures, plans, constraints and training required.  
Figure 5. Spacecraft flight operability assessment scale format 
Operational
Impact
Sim
plicity
M
argin
Flexibility
Robustness
Sit Aw
areness
Control Program 
Impact
1 Excellent operations capabilities Operationally 
desirable.
2 Negligible operational challenges that can be handled with no noticeable impact to operations feasibility or cost Mission can be accomplished
Minimal operational impacts 
can be handled within 
existing inf rastructure and 
budget with negligible 
workload impacts.
3 Operational challenges cause noticeable nuisances to the operator, but can be handled with little impact to 
operations feasibility or cost.
4 Operations are difficult and incur signif icant one time costs (manpower, facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission 
success. Some mission objectives may not be achieved.
Some mission 
objectives may be at 
risk.
Operational impacts will 
change inf rastructure 
requirements, cost 
allocations, work 
prioritization, etc. f rom the 
baseline operations plan.
5 Operations are difficult and incur signif icant recurring costs (manpower, facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission 
success Some mission objectives may not be achieved.
6 Operations are difficult, mission objectives may remain at risk even af ter additional investments (manpower, 
procedures, facilities, etc.) are made.
7 Operational challenges reduce mission capability and degree of  mission success by preventing some objectives Mission is at risk.Operational impacts will 
exceed the capabilities of  
either the operations 
community or the entire 
program.
8 Operational challenges put mission success at risk.  No operational techniques are available to mitigate risk.
9 Operational challenges increase risk of loss of crew or vehicle. No operational techniques are available to mitigate 
risk while preserving mission content.
10 Operationally unsafe or unachievable Not operable.
Can mission be 
accomplished safely?
Can mission be 
accomplished within tolerable 
workload, schedule, 
cost & risk 
limits?
Can mission be
accomplished within normal 
workload, schedule, 
cost & risk 
limits?
No
Yes
System & mission design
No
Yes
Yes
No
*Operability assessment is performed for a specific reference mission or scenario
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Simple systems that have few dependencies and few possible system configurations generally require fewer 
procedures, less training, and less effort to monitor and control.    
Simplicity cannot be measured in the design of the spacecraft and its subsystems alone.  One must also consider 
the challenges of the mission and the spacecraft’s ability to meet those challenges.  Consider the simplest version of 
a car – a pedal powered four wheeled vehicle with a minimum of moving parts and very simple operating and 
maintenance instructions.  Though easy to operate in its intended environment – a driveway or a sidewalk, that same 
vehicle becomes extremely difficult and unsafe (as well as illegal) to operate on a city street or across long 
distances.  Ultimately, a spacecraft design and operating characteristics must be matched to the mission. 
 
1. Example – Apollo LiOH canister incompatibility 
Perhaps the most well known example of complexity in the history of the US human spaceflight program is that 
of the Carbon Dioxide (CO2) scrubbing equipment on the Apollo Command Module and Lunar Module.  The two 
spacecraft, though joined together for much of their mission and sharing both a common crew and a common 
atmosphere, used two separate and incompatible Lithium Hydroxide (LiOH) cartridges to remove CO2 from the 
cabin atmosphere.  One of the more celebrated successes of the Apollo 13 contingency crew return was the real-time 
effort of the operations team to develop a means to use a Command Module LiOH cartridge in the Lunar Module 
system built for a cartridge of a completely different shape.  The use of two entirely different components to perform 
the same function is a clear example of unnecessary complexity in the overall spacecraft architecture. 
 
2. Example – ISS Antenna Management 
The ISS boasts an impressive communications system, including redundant S-Band communication for voice, data 
and core commanding and a Ku-Band system for video, audio and payload data.  Operation of this system requires 
the management of the antennae and their relationship to Tracking and Data Relay Satellites, ensuring that ISS stay 
in contact with satellites that are within line-of-sight.  This function was intended to be managed by software 
onboard the spacecraft, but an effective onboard management function was not available in the flight software for 
the first decade of ISS operations.  Instead, MCC actively managed the onboard system, uplinking commands every 
day to direct the communication system to change its selected target satellite as ISS traveled through its orbit. The 
calculation, generation, and management of the associated commands represented a significant workload for MCC, 
as well as an increased risk of temporary loss of communication in the event of a human error.  Operationally, this 
ground-in-the-loop control process was overly complex.  Today, the flight software capability to manage this system 
has been implemented, reducing the reliance on and workload of the MCC communications and tracking officer. 
 
3. Example – Space Station Evolution from On-Orbit Component Assembly to Pre-Integrated Truss 
Early designs for Space Station Freedom called for the main truss of the vehicle to be a built by hand – a lengthy 
and complicated process requiring astronauts to assemble a square truss from individual poles and connector nodes, 
adding wire harnesses and external avionics components as the truss grew out of the Space Shuttle payload bay.  
This difficult process involved as many as 7 separate robotic systems working in tandem with the astronauts and 
ultimately required the execution of final integrated test and verification of the spacecraft only after it was 
assembled on orbit.  The complexity and risk of this approach became clear as assembly planning and analysis 
studies pointed to problems throughout the process. In the early 1990’s, a fundamental design and philosophy 
change was enacted, implementing a “Pre-Integrated Truss” or PIT to decrease the risk and increase the efficiency 
of on-orbit assembly tasks.7
 
 This design matured as the Space Station Freedom Program evolved into the 
International Space Station Program, and was successfully implemented over the assembly phase of that program.  
Even with this fundamental simplification of the assembly sequence, ISS assembly proved to be a formidable 
engineering challenge.  
4. Recommendations 
To address operability concerns, hardware and software should be as simple as practical, minimizing the number 
of unique interfaces, algorithms, and functions that require separate operational techniques to monitor and control. 
Functions and interfaces should be common and consistent, requiring a reasonable number of tasks and 
methodologies on the part of the operator. Tasks themselves should be simple, allowing the operator to concentrate 
on decisions to be made rather than detailed operational sequences to be performed.  There are reasonable limits on 
the operationally desirable level of simplicity. A system that is so simple that it does not provide the flexibility or 
robustness to perform in off-nominal scenarios is not operationally viable.  Careful consideration of the other 
operability factors should be included in an assessment of the appropriate level of simplicity in a system.  
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B.    Robustness 
Robustness describes the system's ability to cope with changing conditions resulting from both nominal and off-
nominal operations. Flight operations planning and analysis costs are often driven by the need to “protect” the 
system or vehicle from certain conditions and events. The nature and degree of these “protection” measures is 
determined by the system's or vehicle's robustness. Note that provisions such as performance margin and 
consumables margin is assessed in a separate “margin” category. The “robustness” category addresses redundancy, 
fault tolerance, cross-strapping and similar system architecture traits.  
 
1. Example – Increased robustness in the Gemini Spacecraft Design 
During Project Mercury, it was found that the pairing of electrically-sensitive computing equipment with 
mechanical components such as pumps left critical avionics prone to electrical transients that could interfered with 
or even interrupt their operation.  Subsequent spacecraft designs addressed this concern through isolation of critical 
equipment on separate “essential” electrical buses.  Similar approaches were used in other Gemini systems, as 
evidenced by the provision of a separate set of life support, electrical, and propulsion systems dedicated to provide a 
safe emergency return to the Earth’s surface.8
 
  The Space Shuttle architecture reflects this same philosophy not only 
in its electrical power distribution system, but also in its data bus architecture.  Similarly, ISS provides isolation of 
critical system command and control functions from non-critical payload and video systems.  This method of 
compartmentalization and channelization can reduce operational risk, as well as analysis required to ensure that 
nominal and off-nominal subsystem configurations are safe. 
2. Example – Thorough testing in the Apollo Program 
Successful execution of the Apollo Program is attributed in part to its thorough approach to testing.  The limits of 
the hardware and integrated systems were well understood, allowing the program and the operations community to 
make well informed decisions as contingencies, both before and during flight, arose. 
 
3. Example – Space Shuttle Data Processing System (DPS) Redundancy 
The Space Shuttle ushered in an era of greatly expanded software capability in human spaceflight.  General 
Purpose Computers (GPCs) provided overall command and control capabilities for the spacecraft, including closed 
loop control of the systems and flight path during dynamic flight.  To protect against both hardware and software 
malfunctions during these critical operations, the DPS provided both a set of four redundant, synchronized GPCs 
and a separate fifth Backup Flight System (BFS) that used identical computer hardware but dissimilar flight 
software.  The BFS was never used in flight, but the redundant set of primary GPCs provided a robust capability to 
continue flight after failures in individual computers. 
 
4. Recommendations for Achieving Appropriate Robustness 
To achieve operational robustness, flight systems should be designed to maintain fail operational capability (no 
loss of functionality after first failure); the design should ensure no single failure puts the mission in to a 
contingency. Systems should remain partially capable in off-nominal scenarios, allowing the continued use of 
remaining functionality without requiring significant operator action to recover that functionality. In many cases, 
cross-strapping - interconnections between components of two or more separate strings - are effective means for 
improving robustness in off-nominal scenarios. Redundant strings should be supported by separate data and power 
utility feeds to allow continued system availability after a single failure.  
No time-critical operator action should be required to prevent loss of mission, crew or vehicle. Time-critical 
operator actions are those that must be performed by a person within a limited time frame immediately following an 
event to ensure continued safe and effective mission execution. In general, the vehicle should automatically identify 
and reconfigure in response to failures that can impact mission success or crew/vehicle survival. Automated 
responses should result in predictable vehicle configurations that support crew and vehicle survival.    
The need for robustness is somewhat bound by the overall goals and mission scenarios that define the system and 
its operation. For a given spacecraft, a set of reference missions and configurations defines cases in which the 
vehicle is expected to either complete or abort the mission. Robustness should be provided to support mission 
execution within the expected bounds (including off-nominal scenarios) and to support mission abort or early 
termination once the defined criteria have been met. Robustness beyond that needed for these cases may not be 
warranted.  
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C. Margin 
Operational margin describes the amount of capability or consumable supplies available beyond that required to 
execute the mission. Operational margin provides assurance that the nominal mission may be safely executed and 
allows for continued operation in the event of unexpected conditions such as malfunction or mission scenario 
changes.    
There are three categories of operational margin: 
 
• Performance Margin - the ability of the system to provide greater capability than required for normal 
operation or in the event of any single failure. Measures of performance margin vary by vehicle 
subsystem.  For example, performance margin for an electrical power system might be measured by 
power output capability while the measure for a communication system might be associated with the data 
bandwidth sizing. 
• Resource Margin - the amount of consumable commodities (propellant, atmospheric gases, stored energy) 
available beyond that required to support nominal flight operations.  
• Environmental Tolerance Margin - the system's ability to operate beyond the nominal operations 
environment for a given mission profile.   
 
Often, operational constraints and controls are required to ensure that adequate capability is available throughout 
a nominal mission and after an anomaly. These constraints and controls typically impact the ability to successfully 
complete all mission goals, as they limit the use of capabilities and resources even before an anomaly occurs. They 
also require the addition of more techniques, tools, products and training to the operations infrastructure. All of these 
additions result in increased life cycle cost. Margin is considered available for operational consideration only when 
formal analysis documentation of that margin is made available to the operations community. Lack of margin can 
have profound impacts on mission planning as well as real-time operations. More detailed pre-flight analysis must 
be performed to ensure that mission objectives may be met within the available resources, that the vehicle can 
perform required operations within its normal performance envelope, withstand potential anomalies, and that the 
flight environment does not exceed the vehicle's limits. Lack of margin not only impacts the mission operations 
organization, but it also drives significant program sustaining engineering costs to provide additional case-specific 
analyses that support the flight operations community as well as program strategic planning.  
 
Figure 6 provides a simple example 
of Space Shuttle cryogenic Oxygen 
resource margin over the last 
decade.  The availability of a 
reasonable margin allows the 
operations community to deal with 
contingency situations and often 
add a day to the mission duration to 
allow for the completion of mission 
objectives.  The red regions in each 
bar on this graph indicate occasions 
in which this margin was partially 
used in order to meet the needs of 
the mission.  Also noteworthy is the 
ability to add an Extended Duration 
Orbiter (EDO) pallet kit, used on 
several mission including STS-107, 
to enable missions requiring 
additional time on-orbit.  This and 
other forms of flexibility will be 
discussed further below. 
 
 
1. Example – Creating Power Resource Margin During Early ISS Operations 
During the early phases of ISS assembly, the US segment of the spacecraft had very limited redundancy in 
powering critical subsystems.  With only 2 power channels available, the US power system was easily loaded to 
Figure 6. Space Shuttle cryogenic Oxygen loading and usage over the 
past decade. 
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capacity in supporting not only the vehicle core systems, but also early science operations.  Each power channel 
could support a load of approximately 18 kW, but the failure of any one of the three batteries would cause an 
immediate overload – and shutdown – of one of the two power channels.  To make matters worse, loss of power to 
the critical command, control and communications systems would leave the crew and ground unable to take action 
for several minutes as the data system reconfigured in response to multiple computer loses.  With the risk of a major 
setback early in the program, program and operations management determined that the power budget for each 
channel would be limited to ensure that each power channel could continue to operate after that first potential 
battery failure.  In effect, a 1/3 margin was imposed on all operations.  As vehicle assembly continued, the US 
power system grew from its early 2 channel configuration to a full 8 channel system.   
 
2. Example – Environmental Tolerance Limits During ISS Assembly 
Early in ISS assembly operations, the STS-92 mission gave a clear example of environmental tolerance limits 
and their impact on operations complexity.  STS-92 delivered the Z1 element – a large square truss segment 
containing key power, communications, thermal and attitude control system components to the fledgling ISS.  Until 
crewmembers could attach data and electrical umbilicals to power the Z1 components and heaters associated with 
those components, flight attitudes exposing those components to sunlight were necessary to maintain temperatures 
above individual component freeze points.  Unfortunately, these same sun-pointing attitudes placed too much 
sunlight on the Space Shuttle’s airlock water lines, risking overheating and damage to the airlock required to support 
the mission’s EVAs.  Further complicating the mission planning process, the lack of power and data connections to 
those components prevented the crew and ground from monitoring these temperatures directly.  Instead, pre-flight 
thermal predictions alone would provide the basis for the operators’ understanding of risk to ISS equipment.  
Thorough analyses of both Space Shuttle and ISS temperature profiles  - analyses involving not just the flight 
operations community, but also the program office and spacecraft vendors to investigate secondary impacts to 
propellant usage, communications availability, and many other factors- were required to support the development of 
a flight attitude timeline that would meet all of the constraints placed on this mission.  Ultimately, a carefully 
orchestrated series of attitude maneuvers were performed, flipping the mated Shuttle-ISS “stack” repeatedly 
throughout the EVA. The mission was successful, but at a cost of months of analysis employing a large community 
of engineers. 
 
3. Example – Performance Limits Impacting ISS Operations 
Changes in the Space Station assembly plan impacted the sequence in which vehicle elements would be 
delivered and the flight attitudes and environments that those elements to which those elements would be exposed.  
One of the many results was a significant increase in the rotation of solar arrays.  Rotary joints intended to slowly 
pan back and forth over a period of weeks were now required to continuously rotate at 4 degrees per minute for 
years at a time.  This far exceeded the performance requirements for the joints and, predictably, the joints began to 
exhibit the effects of wear in flight.  Bearings developed increased resistance, occasionally exceeding their drive 
motor torque limit and “tripping” the joint control offline.  The engineering and operations community worked 
together to develop a number of new operating techniques, procedures and modes both to reduce the frequency of 
rotation and to respond to the accumulation of torque resistance.  These techniques were successful and allowed the 
continuation of ISS assembly to the point where such frequent and high rate rotation is not required.  However, this 
serves as an example of performance and performance margin that was not properly matched to the mission 
requirements. 
 
4. Recommendations for Achieving Appropriate Margin 
Flight systems should provide margin in order to minimize operations constraints. Vehicle thermal, power, and 
communications capabilities should not be designed with operations constraints that result in the necessity for highly 
optimized mission timelines to accomplish normal operations such as rendezvous, proximity operations, and 
docking. Margin in all three of these categories is a significant driver in determining the amount and extent of 
mission- and activity-specific planning and analysis. Significant positive margins in key categories should be 
available in all mission phases.  
At the same time, excessive margin is not operationally desirable and should be avoided. For example, a system 
that provides resource quantities beyond any credible need may use so large a fraction of the allowable mass that 
fewer redundant strings are provided in the design. Expectations on available margin should be bounded by the 
maximum needs for an operational scenario (including off-nominal scenarios). In addition, care should be taken in 
scenarios that involve failure “stacking” (inclusion of multiple separate failure cases in one scenario). Credible 
failure scenarios include those that would allow continued mission execution and those that would initiate the abort 
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or early termination of a mission. Failures after those that drive a mission abort or early termination are generally 
out of scope. 
D. Flexibility 
 Flexibility is the ability of the system to accommodate change. This change can be to the mission scenario or to 
the vehicle configuration. When a system is inflexible, even small changes to the mission or vehicle configuration 
may require operational workarounds – additional tasks and responsibilities placed on operations personnel and 
facilities. Flexibility is generally defined by the system's architecture.     
 
1. Example – Space Shuttle Flexible Payload Capabilities 
The space shuttle provided flexibility through a variety of standardized services.  Standardized payload attachment 
systems allowed for a wide variety of payloads and missions.  Add-on kits such as the Extended Duration Orbiter 
(EDO) Pallet kit further extended the space shuttle’s capabilities, enabling greater science content and longer 
mission durations. Rather than engineering new solutions for each mission, the Space Shuttle program successfully 
managed an impressive array of separate payloads – from space telescopes and communications satellites to orbital 
laboratories and space station components – using such standardized interfaces. 
 
2. Recommendations for Achieving Appropriate Flexibility 
Flexible flight systems should be easily reconfigured or updated to account for new conditions and new 
capabilities during flight or between flights. Although this applies to both flight hardware and flight software, the 
impacts of inflexible software are the more acute. Operational experience often identifies necessary changes to 
limits, gains, and other parameters used by flight software. If recompilation of flight software is required to update 
such parameters, then these value updates will be costly and will require months or years to incorporate.  
Operational workarounds will be required for extended periods in order to account for discrepancies between the 
desired and provided values.   
There are reasonable limits to the desired degree of flexibility for an operable system. While some amount of 
flexibility is desired to allow for slight variation in mission profile and vehicle configuration, excessive flexibility 
can result in additional operations challenges. Highly flexible systems may require more training, product 
development, and manual tending than is operationally desirable or affordable.    
E. Situation awareness 
Situation Awareness (SA) is the ability to perceive the state of the vehicle and its operational environment, to 
understand that state, and to project the future state based on that understanding. If systems do not inherently support 
SA, additional operator tools and techniques may be required to provide this insight and understanding.  This may 
drive additional operations cost and infrastructure such as facility changes, procedures, training, or even additional 
flight control team staffing. The inability to identify specific anomalies in some scenarios may increase risks to 
mission, crew and vehicle. As a result, some activities or objectives may be disallowed when SA cannot be 
maintained.  
 
1. Example – Mercury instrumentation 
The very first US orbital flight provided valuable lessons in the importance of appropriate insight into system 
health and status.  A single faulty sensor indicated that the landing bag had deployed, potentially compromising the 
heat shield and making atmospheric entry a deadly operation. The operations team scrambled to analyze the 
spacecraft’s condition, and ultimately modified entry procedures to reduce the risk of heat shield loss. Ultimately, it 
was determined that the landing bag and heat shield had been intact and that the deploy sensor itself had failed.  
9Without a way to confirm this while in flight, the conservative approach taken by the crew and flight control team 
was the best course of action.   Learning from this and similar experiences, NASA adopted a standard of providing 
“confirming cues” in the Gemini program and beyond, ensuring that secondary cues would be available to confirm 
indications of both nominal and off-nominal conditions.10
 
 
2. Example – International Space Station Caution and Warning 
The International Space Station provides thousands of separate caution & warning messages to indicate specific 
problems.  In the event of significant anomalies - such as loss of an electrical or data bus - dozens of messages may 
be issued to announce each of the multitude of system impacts. Without an automated management system or an 
overarching tool to “synthesize” caution and warning messages into clear indications of failure root cause and 
system impacts, the crew and ground must work through these messages to identify the root cause and critical 
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impacts of that failure.  This is enabled through the development and use of detailed procedures and significant 
training to ensure that the operations community is prepared to deal with such cases in real-time. 
 
3. Recommendations for Achieving Appropriate Situation Awareness 
A balanced approach should be taken in assessing situation awareness.  Maintaining situation awareness requires 
the operator to have an overall understanding of the system's state, capabilities and environment. Too much data can 
make this understanding almost as difficult to maintain as can too little data.  The best approach to achieving 
balanced situation awareness is the direct involvement of the flight operations community – both crewmembers and 
flight control personnel – in the process of defining system instrumentation and user interfaces. 
Situation awareness should be assured through appropriate telemetry and caution and warning messages which 
allow unambiguous detection and verification of all nominal and off-nominal events. Critical instrumentation, such 
as temperature, mechanism position, and current sensors, should be carefully positioned to directly measure the most 
critical points in the system, reducing or eliminating the need to infer critical information from indirect 
measurements.  The instrumentation strategy should provide a means to confirm the indications of one sensor using 
another measured value to mitigate the risk of a single sensor failure  Appropriate sensor locations and quantities, as 
well as telemetry display/downlink capabilities should allow the operator to verify automatically generated cues. 
Simple indications should be provided to the operator to identify failures with widespread vehicle impacts. No false 
positive or false negative failure indications should be provided to the operator.   
F. Control 
Control measures the degree and difficulty with which the operator can direct the system's performance during 
operation. This includes not only the availability of all of the control capabilities to appropriately configure the 
system, but also the level of control that the operator must exercise. Use of low level commands – those that control 
individual items at a fine level – may be necessary at times to accomplish specific needs. However, reliance on only 
these low level commands can result in high operator workload because each component must be individually 
configured to accomplish a goal. Higher level commands – those that cause the system to perform multiple steps to 
achieve a predefined configuration – can greatly reduce the level of difficulty in operating the system. Accordingly, 
one effective measure of control is the average count of the number of commands required to implement desired 
courses of action.    
Ineffective commanding capabilities may require the development of additional ground-based software tools to 
support the configuration management, processing, and issuance of commands in an effective manner. Additional 
procedures may be required to support the configuration and processing of commands. Additional training is 
required to enable operators to use these tools and procedures. All of these add to the infrastructure, cost and time 
associated with controlling the spacecraft.  
 
1. Example – Mercury Manual Control Capabilities 
Project Mercury mangers recognized the technical risks they had undertaken in launching a man into space.  Not 
only were they rapidly developing new flight systems, but they also had no knowledge of the human’s ability to 
function in a weightless environment.  In response, Mercury was designed to provide both fully automated and 
manual control for most flight phases including ascent .  As mentioned above, this approach greatly benefited the 
program by enabling the astronaut to assume control when automated systems malfunctioned, but the cost and 
complexity associated with fully automating systems proved a daunting challenge. 
 
2. Example – ISS Command Complexity 
As compared to its predecessors, the ISS incorporated a staggering number of separate computers and firmware 
controllers, creating a diverse and distributed network of control loops across the vehicle.  The tiered structure of 
hardware control, firmware control, and software control resulted in a complex command architecture.  Although 
common Orbital Replaceable Units (ORUs) and firmware controllers  were used wherever possible, flight software 
for the ISS’s US segment was developed separately by each of the four major development contractors.  Remote 
Power Control Modules (RPCMs) – the basic building block of the electoral power distribution system – were 
integral parts of each contractor’s contribution to the vehicle.  Each contractor therefore developed and delivered its 
own separate RPCM control software and implemented the operator command capabilities in a different form.  
Despite the use of common equipment, the user’s command interface appeared overly complex due to these 
variations.  Ultimately, the operations community invested significant effort in creating embedded logic within the 
crew displays, forcing a consistent user interface from the crewmember’s viewpoint.   
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In other portions of the power system, commands were unnecessarily complex, including such items as “Hot 
Switch Open Override Inhibit Arm” – the first of two commands sent to allow the operator to subsequently 
command open a switch even when the firmware was set to reject such a command.  Such double- and triple-
negative commands are relatively commonplace and require careful re-naming on operator displays to make user 
interfaces intuitive for the operators. 
 
3. Recommendations for Achieving Appropriate Control 
Command capabilities should allow the operator to control vehicle functions by setting goals and making 
decisions when queried. Once these goals and decisions have been provided by the crew, the vehicle implements 
them with little or no additional work required on the part of the crew. Routine functions (those that always involve 
the same steps executed in the same order) should be automated. Where appropriate, low-level commands should 
still be provided to allow for effective operations in off-nominal situations. A tell-tale sign of inappropriate 
command strategy is the prevalence of operational procedures that include few decision points but many sequential 
command or switch throw steps. In such cases, automation\of those non-decisional steps should be considered as a 
means to reduce crew workload and system sensitivity to human error. 
The system should operate and respond in a repeatable, predictable manner to each command. The operator 
should have control over the execution of automated capabilities, allowing him/her to proactively prevent or 
reactively terminate the execution of inappropriate actions. The operator should have the capability to correct the 
vehicle configuration when automation either fails to do so or places the vehicle in an undesirable configuration.   
Automation may be applied to address some control needs, but automation may also create other operability 
challenges. In general, automation of well understood operations is achievable and operationally desirable.  
However, automation of actions or responses to scenarios that are not well understood can make operations more 
difficult. Where automation functions must be monitored by operators, halted as required, and replaced by operator 
actions, the automation function may be operationally undesirable. Even in well understood scenarios, the flexibility 
to modify automation through the use of reconfigurable scripts, settings, and other flexibility measures is highly 
recommended.  
III. Challenges in Achieving Operability 
       If we understand the problems, why do we not fully address them?  Although program managers and subsystem 
designers alike may understand the need for spacecraft flight operability, there remain programmatic challenges in 
implementing operationally desirable features.  Recognizing and addressing these challenges early in a development 
program is an essential step in establishing reasonable design and operations solutions. 
A.  Development Cost – Now v. Later 
Any spaceflight program faces significant challenges as design, development and test efforts encounter 
problems.   Cost increases and schedule slips place increased pressure on program management to reduce program 
content where possible.  Priorities shift from optimizing operations phase cost performance to preserving enough 
funding for the delivery and testing of hardware and software.   
During the development phase of Space Station Freedom - the original design that evolved into today's ISS - 
then prime contractor predicted a 50% reduction in operations costs through the implementation of onboard 
monitoring and management functions.11
Breaking this cycle – the deferral or deletion of future cost savings enablers in the interest of meeting near term 
goals – is a difficult program challenge and ultimately requires increased development phase funding. 
  The Onboard Management Application (OMA) would track resource 
availability and usage and collaborate with other onboard software to ensure that the vehicle automatically adjusted 
in response to resource issues.  As the design matured, the top tier of the data processing system was deleted; with it 
the OMA also disappeared.  The associated tasks of tracking, predicting, and managing onboard resources was 
relegated to the Mission Control Center, where unique tools and separate console positions were defined to perform 
these functions.  The design changes judged necessary to reduce development cost and risk ultimately erased the 
potential for achieving the originally predicted operations costs savings. 
 
B.   Verification & Validation – Risk and Cost 
Every feature and function of a spacecraft invokes both a risk and a cost associated with verification and 
validation.  Program managers are faced with the option of deleting or reducing spacecraft capabilities in order to 
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reduce cost and schedule risks.  Where spacecraft capabilities cannot be reduced, reducing the number of unique 
tests and analyses to be completed remains a tantalizing option to address cost and schedule concerns.   
Unfortunately, these risk reduction efforts can negatively impact the flight operations community.  When a 
vehicle system is tested and analyzed only for the conditions nominal design reference mission conditions, the 
performance and limits of the vehicle in off-nominal conditions remains unknown.  Concerns over possible damage 
to the spacecraft in such unknown conditions increases the need to “protect” the vehicle from such cases and 
ultimately drives the operations community to perform their own analyses, impose more operational constraints, 
develop more contingency procedures, and provide more training to their personnel.  The cost of flight operations 
increases to compensate for the losses incurred in reducing development phase costs. 
Early Space Shuttle operations proved difficult as the flight operations team worked to understand the complex 
interaction of the vehicle’s subsystems even as they provided real-time flight control support.  Incomplete analysis 
of these interactions during the development phase left the operations team with a significant workload to discover 
and fully understand the complex ways in which the vehicle behaved.  The engineering and flight operations 
communities alike invested years of operations in understanding these interactions and formally documenting the 
interactions and responses in procedures and operational flight rules.12
The International Space Station “inherited” much of its design from its predecessor – the Space Station Freedom 
Program.  The basic vehicle system architecture, as well as its components, were designed for environment in a 
relatively low inclination orbit – 28.5 degrees.  As the reborn ISS, however, these systems and components are 
subjected to the extremes of a much higher inclination orbit – a 51.6 degree inclination – to enable inclusion of 
Russian elements and Russian launch vehicles in the overall vehicle assembly. This simple change in mission 
profile, coupled with other major vehicle architecture changes, had significant impacts on overall vehicle 
operability.  New extremes in thermal environment included days-long periods of continuous daylight as well as 
shadow patterns cast by the vehicle’s own structure.  Time and budget allowed for analysis of some – but not all – 
possible combinations of vehicle attitude and sun exposure, leaving open many questions as to the true 
environmental tolerance of the vehicle.  Lack of a thorough understanding of the ISS thermal environment and 
spacecraft component thermal tolerances prior to the operations phase drove the need for significant effort during 
the operations phase to analyze specific cases of unusual attitudes for specific events such as docking and 
undocking.  
 
C. Lack of Flight Operations Inclusion in Early System Engineering Processes 
 The flight operations infrastructure - facilities, people, and processes - are an integral part of the overall system, 
"closing the loop" to control the spacecraft throughout it's mission.  As such, that flight operations infrastructure is 
itself a critical control loop that should be carefully designed and measured just as any other spacecraft system or 
program process.  However, funding for flight operations specialists in the early phases of a program is typically 
minimal and prioritized much lower than funding for other personnel.  This often stems from a basic 
misunderstanding of the role and contribution of the operations community as systems engineers.  As a result, true 
cost implications of design solutions are generally not understood or appreciated in time to make informed 
decisions. 
Involvement in definition of operations concepts, requirements, functional allocation of capabilities, and 
implementation trade studies are 
all essential to addressing 
operations phase cost 
performance.  Involving the 
operations community only once 
the requirements and design 
have been determined will result 
in higher operations complexity, 
risk and cost.  Where integrated 
design solutions – those that 
address the balance of onboard 
capabilities, ground capabilities, 
and human interaction with both 
– could be developed, a process 
that does not include the operations community typically shifts (rather than reduces) cost from the development of 
onboard capabilities to the investment in additional ground-based resources and task loading. 
Figure 7. Flight Operations Feedback Opportunities Throughout 
the Program Lifecycle. 
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A comprehensive strategy of flight operations involvement throughout the program lifecycle, as illustrated in 
Figure 7, can benefit human spaceflight programs, both in terms of mission success and program affordability. 
 
IV. Application to Future Programs 
NASA has applied these lessons learned in supporting the development of the Orion Spacecraft – now the basis 
for the Multipurpose Crew Exploration Vehicle (MPCV).  Flight operations team member involvement in defining 
design reference missions, fault management schemes, subsystem architectures, and flight software functionality 
have helped the program improve the operability of its vehicle and enable future cost savings.  For example, early 
analysis of the Orion Active Thermal Control System hardware and software design by flight operations personnel 
identified opportunities to significantly improve system robustness through better control schemes and judicious 
addition of flexibility in the control software.  These changes were adopted with no net cost to the program. 
Continued collaboration between the spacecraft development and flight operations will allow the MPCV Program to 
continue to identify and address opportunities to improve flight operability. 
Flight operability concerns will become even more critical to the success of human spaceflight endeavors as we 
develop and operate spacecraft that venture farther into space.  Deep space flight imposes new operational 
constraints including the inability to execute a timely emergency return as well as time delayed communications and  
reduced communications bandwidth that reduce the ability to apply ground-based real-time support in response to 
real-time events.  The next generation of space exploration vehicles must address operability concerns to enable 
their crews to survive and succeed. 
Similarly, the emerging commercial human spaceflight sector must address flight operability concerns in order to 
achieve cost effective operations and realize profitable overall corporate operations. NASA’s lessons learned can be 
a valuable resource in developing cost effective solutions. 
V. Conclusion 
Future human spacecraft development programs can directly benefit from analysis of previous programs’ 
successes and failures in addressing flight operability and its associated costs.  Direct involvement of flight 
operations personnel in the development of operations concepts, requirements, and design solutions is a critical step 
in addressing operations phase cost.  Formal methods such as use of the Flight Operability Assessment Scale, can 
identify issues and impacts earlier in the development processes.  Application of the lessons learned in the first 50 
years of NASA’s human spaceflight campaign can directly benefit new programs by improving spacecraft designs 
and reducing flight operations costs and risk. 
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How Operable is Your Spacecraft?
What is flight operability?
Flight Operability - flīt ä-p(ə-)rə-bi-lə-tē, noun.
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maximum mission success, minimal risk, and minimum operating cost. 
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design processes.
How can this benefit your
program?
Flight operability assessment adds another 
capability to the program manager’s toolset
Operability issues are linked to 
safety, reliability, performance, 
etc., but there are other tools 
available to assess these topics.
The operability assessment tool 
adds to the program 
management toolset.
Operability
Maintainability
Safety
Reliability
Sustainability
Affordability
Ops
Concept
Requirements Design Review
Build & 
Operate
Operations concept 
definition includes factors 
that impact flight 
operations System requirements 
include operability criteria
Formal operability assessments 
ensure requirements 
compliance
Operability criteria provide 
clear guidance for design 
implementation
Operability assessments 
applied to proposed design 
changes and upgrades
Functional Flow
Block Diagrams
Program 
Phase
Application
Formal definitions and criteria for flight 
operability can benefit the Program throughout 
its life cycle.
Operability Theme Score Description Operational Impact Program Impact
Simplicity
5 Multiple nominal and off nominal 
procedures as well as operational 
workarounds to disable and release 
dampers indicate inherent undesirable 
complexity in the system.  
Complexity increases operator w orkload, requiring 
additional tools and techniques (procedures, 
constraints, etc.).
Some mission objectives 
may be at risk.  
Margin
8 Little margin is available in the APDS 
hooks.  Single hook out cases drive the 
need for significant system workarounds 
(PMA hooks, FR constraints etc).  
Single point jam on the ball screw 
mechanism could lead to loss of 
mission.
Inadequate margin induces risk of loss of mission. Mission is at risk.
Flexibility
3 The semi-automatic docking sequence 
allows for much greater system 
flexibility but also poses issues with 
added training due to it's complexity.
Functions enabling f lexibility induce additional operator 
w orkload w ithin reasonable limits.
Mission can be 
accomplished.  
Robustness
8 Capture latches require manual 
reconfiguring after the first failure to 
return to a nominal configuration.  A 
single point jam on the ball screw 
mechanism can cause loss of mission.
Inability to recover suff icient functionality increases 
risk of loss of mission.
Mission is at risk.
Situation 
Awareness
3 In general, enough insight into the health 
and operation of the docking system is 
available to MCC.  Some coordination 
with crew to attain crew only insight (A7 
panel lights add to MCC workload. 
Required effort to maintain Situational Aw areness 
results in minor w orkload impacts.
Mission can be 
accomplished.  
Control
3 Lack of ground control capability limits 
MCC ability to operate the docking 
system in off nominal situations.  
Command & control interfaces and tasks impact 
w orkload but remain in reasonable limits.
Mission can be 
accomplished.  
Sample Space Shuttle Flight 
Operability Assessment
Docking attachment system  operability 
assessment for docking operations
Scores in simplicity, margin and 
robustness scores reflect the 
significant operational impacts of 
even a single failure in the 
subsystem. 
Scores relatively well in the 
categories of flexibility, situation 
awareness and control, though 
some limitations capabilities are 
noted. 
The Spacecraft Flight Operability Assessment Scale is a product of the Mission Operations Directorate at NASA’s Johnson Space Center.
Point of Contact:  Alan Crocker, alan.r.crocker@nasa.gov
By identifying ways in which operations 
techniques can address problem areas, flight 
operability assessment can also identify 
opportunities to make the system developer’s 
job easier.
How is flight operability measured?
Grading scale 
• Define the range of possible scores and 
their implications to ops and the program 
• The resulting grades must have meaning 
for both the operations community and 
the program management community.
Criteria
• General questions that 
characterize operations impact
• Can be customized for each 
theme
Operability Factors
• Capture the general factors that drive 
ops complexity
• Include description of desired 
characteristics in each theme
Can mission be 
accomplished safely?
Can mission be 
accomplished within tolerable
workload, cost, schedule 
& risk limits?
Can mission be 
accomplished within normal
workload, schedule, 
cost & risk 
limits?
Improvement
Mandatory
Deficiencies 
require
improvement
Deficiencies
warrant
improvement
No
Yes
System and mission design
No
Yes
No
Yes
Operationally
acceptable
10
8
5
2
3
1
6
4
9
7
Ideal
Below this point, 
anticipated capabilities or 
budget levels are not 
supportable
Moderate impact
Moderate impact
Significant impact
Some impact
Significant impact
Some impact
Negligible issues
Nuisance issues
Ideal
Unsafe
Robustness
Flexibility
Margin
Control
Situation
Awareness
Simplicity
Simplicity Margin Flexibility Robustness Situation Awareness Control
1
Functions, interfaces and 
tasks require lowest practical 
operator workload and 
infrastructure.
Significant useful margin 
is available in most or all 
cases.
Flexibility is seamlessly provided 
without requiring additional operator 
action.
No further action is required 
of the operator after this 
reconfiguration
SA is properly maintained in all scenarios 
with no additional operator action 
required.
Command interfaces are 
efficient and do not contribute 
significantly to operator 
workload.
2
Minor complexity may cause 
nuisances but does not 
impact operator workload.
Some useful margin is 
available in most cases.
Functions enabling flexibility induce 
nuisances but do not impact 
operator workload.
System functionality is 
preserved, but non-critical 
activities may be temporarily 
impacted by the recovery 
process.
Minor nuisances in SA tools are 
noticeable but do not add to operator 
workload.
Command & control interfaces 
include some nuisances that do 
not impact workload.
3
Minor complexity increases 
operator workload, but 
workload remains in 
reasonable limits.
Slight useful margin is 
available in most cases.
Functions enabling flexibility induce 
additional operator workload within 
reasonable limits.
System functionality is 
preserved, but some 
activities may be interrupted 
until additional manual steps 
are taken.
Required effort to maintain Situational 
Awareness results in minor workload 
impacts.
Command & control interfaces 
and tasks impact workload but 
remain in reasonable limits.
4
Complexity increases 
operator workload and 
requires additional tools to 
support the operator.
Lack of margin drives 
additional operations 
infrastructure (facility 
capabilities).
Additional tools and infrastructure 
must be developed to support 
flexibility (data and software 
reconfiguration, etc.)
Additional operator action is 
required to establish normal 
function after a failure.
Additional tools must be developed to 
achieve the necessary level of Situational 
Awareness.
Additional infrastructure must 
be developed to support 
command and control 
capabilities.
5
Complexity increases 
operator workload, requiring 
additional tools and 
techniques (procedures, 
constraints, etc.).
Lack of margin drives 
additional infrastructure 
and processes (facility 
capabilities, analysis and 
procedures).
Excessive procedural workarounds 
and processes are required to 
accommodate the lack of inherent 
system flexibility.
Operator must manually pre-
configure systems to ensure 
proper response to possible 
failures.
Additional techniques (procedures, 
training, etc.) must be developed to 
achieve the necessary level of Situational 
Awareness.
Extra tools and procedures are 
required to achieve necessary 
control.
6
Complexity drives 
infrastructure costs, but risk 
to some mission objectives 
remains.
Additional infrastructure 
and processes cannot 
fully mitigate risk to 
mission objectives.
Infrastructure and procedural 
workarounds are required, but even 
these do not mitigate all risk to some 
mission objectives.
Manual pre-configuration 
alone cannot completely 
mitigate risks, some mission 
objectives remain at risk.
Even with additional tools and 
techniques, some non-critical conditions 
cannot be effectively identified.
Extra tools and techniques are 
required to achieve necessary 
control, but workload impacts 
may impede completion of 
some mission objectives.
7
Complexity prevents 
accomplishment of some 
mission objectives.
Inadequate margin 
prevents accomplishment 
of some mission 
objectives.
Lack of necessary flexibility will 
result in loss of some mission 
objectives.
Inability to recover sufficient 
functionality prevent 
completion of some mission 
objectives.
Lack of suitable SA imposes constraints 
on activities and operations, placing 
mission objectives at risk.
Insufficient control capability is 
provided to support execution 
of some mission objectives.
8
Complexity drives operational 
constraints that threaten 
mission success.
Inadequate margin 
induces risk of loss of 
mission.
Lack of necessary flexibility induces 
additional risk of loss of mission.
Inability to recover sufficient 
functionality increases risk of 
loss of mission.
Lack of suitable SA increases risk of loss 
of mission due to potential operator error.
Insufficient control capability is 
provided to respond to 
anomalies that risk loss of 
mission.
9
Complexity drives operational 
constraints that increase risk 
of loss of crew or vehicle.
Inadequate margin 
induces risk of loss of 
crew/vehicle.
Lack of necessary flexibility induces 
additional risk of loss of crew or 
vehicle.
Inability to recover sufficient 
functionality increases risk of 
loss of crew or vehicle.
Lack of suitable SA increases risk of loss 
of crew or vehicle due to potential 
operator error.
Insufficient control capability is 
provided to respond to 
anomalies that risk loss of 
crew/vehicle.
10
Complexity results in 
unacceptable risk to the 
mission, vehicle and crew.
Inadequate margin is 
available to execute 
mission.
Inflexibility prevents reconfiguration 
required to safely execute missions.
Inability to properly 
reconfigure after a single 
failure causes loss of crew or 
vehicle.
Data or cues required to recognize  
critical events (nominal or off-nominal) 
are incorrect or not available.  Incorrect 
indications will cause the operator to take 
inappropriate critical  actions that impact 
crew/vehicle survival. Will cause critical 
impacts to nominal operations.
Control interfaces or 
methodology will cause critical 
impacts to nominal operations 
(loss of crew/vehicle). 
Robustness
Flexibility
Margin
Control
Situation
Awareness
Simplicity
The Spacecraft Flight Operability Assessment Scale provides a 
formal, structured approach to measuring operability.
Operational
Impact
Sim
plicity
M
argin
Flexibility
Robustness
Sit Aw
areness
Control Program 
Impact
1 Excellent operations capabilities Operationally 
desirable.
2 Negligible operational challenges that can be handled with no noticeable impact to operations feasibility or cost Mission can be accomplished
Minimal operational impacts 
can be handled within 
existing inf rastructure and 
budget with negligible 
workload impacts.
3 Operational challenges cause noticeable nuisances to the operator, but can be handled with little impact to 
operations feasibility or cost.
4 Operations are difficult and incur signif icant one time costs (manpower, facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission 
success. Some mission objectives may not be achieved.
Some mission 
objectives may be at 
risk.
Operational impacts will 
change inf rastructure 
requirements, cost 
allocations, work 
prioritization, etc. f rom the 
baseline operations plan.
5 Operations are difficult and incur signif icant recurring costs (manpower, facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission 
success Some mission objectives may not be achieved.
6 Operations are difficult, mission objectives may remain at risk even af ter additional investments (manpower, 
procedures, facilities, etc.) are made.
7 Operational challenges reduce mission capability and degree of  mission success by preventing some objectives Mission is at risk.Operational impacts will 
exceed the capabilities of  
either the operations 
community or the entire 
program.
8 Operational challenges put mission success at risk.  No operational techniques are available to mitigate risk.
9 Operational challenges increase risk of loss of crew or vehicle. No operational techniques are available to mitigate 
risk while preserving mission content.
10 Operationally unsafe or unachievable Not operable.
Can mission be 
accomplished safely?
Can mission be 
accomplished within tolerable 
workload, schedule, 
cost & risk 
limits?
Can mission be
accomplished within normal 
workload, schedule, 
cost & risk 
limits?
No
Yes
System & mission design
No
Yes
Yes
No
*Operability assessment is performed for a specific reference mission or scenario
Operational Impact Programmatic impact
1 Excellent operations capabilities Operationally desirable. 
2 Negligible operational challenges that can be handled with no noticeable 
impact to operations feasibility or cost
Mission can be accomplished
Minimal operational impacts can 
be handled within existing 
infrastructure and budget with 
negligible workload impacts.
3 Operational challenges cause noticeable nuisances to the operator, but can 
be handled with little impact to operations feasibility or cost.
4 Operations are difficult and incur significant one time costs (manpower, 
facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission success. Some mission objectives 
may not be achieved.
Some mission objectives may be 
at risk. Operational impacts will 
change infrastructure 
requirements, cost allocations, 
work prioritization, etc. from the 
baseline operations plan.  
5 Operations are difficult and incur significant recurring costs (manpower, 
facilities, products, etc.) to ensure mission success. Some mission objectives 
may not be achieved.
6 Operations are difficult, mission objectives may remain at risk even after 
additional investments (manpower, procedures, facilities, etc.) are made.
7 Operational challenges reduce mission capability and degree of mission 
success by preventing some objectives 
Mission is at risk.
Operational impacts will exceed 
the capabilities of either the 
operations community or the 
entire program.
8 Operational challenges put mission success at risk.  No operational 
techniques are available to mitigate risk.
9 Operational challenges increase risk of loss of crew or vehicle. No 
operational techniques are available to mitigate risk while preserving mission 
content.
10 Operationally unsafe or unachievable Not operable. 
